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INTRODUCTION
The Thai, agricultural sector was the leading sector in the Thai 
economy during its crucial two decades of growth in the 1960s and the 
1970s. That role has been taken over by the manufacturing sector 
during the 1980s, and what happens in agriculture appears to count for 
less as far as the macroeconomic performance is concerned. 
Nevertheless, it is important to look at the sector for two reasons:
- The agricultural sector still occupies a considerable 
number of people— something of the order of 60-65 per cent 
of the labor force;
- A historical account of the growth of Thai agriculture is 
necessary in order to understand the impact of its 
dynamics on the industrialization process, particularly as 
the sector begins to shed much of the labor force that is 
presently in it.
The discussion below will be divided into three parts, the first 
will discuss the basic economic forces that are driving the sector, 
with the emphasis on Thailand’s comparative advantage in this sector 
and its various components; the second will discuss its institutional
2framework of the sector; followed finally by an outlining of 
government policies towards it.
OUTPUT AND INPUTS
The Output Mix
The growth of Thai agricultural output has been rapid, by 
international standards. The rates of growth are 1.9 per cent for the 
period 1951 to 1958, 5.4 per cent between 1958 and 1973 and 3.9 per
cent between 1973 and 1984. Much of this growth has been made
possible because of the presence of large areas of unuused land.
Within the agricultural sector, the crop subsector account for 
about three-quarters of the total agricultural value-added, and the 
livestock subsector in turn accounts for about a half of the 
remaining. Both these shares have been approximately contant since 
1960. The fisheries subsector has been gaining ground rapidly until 
1980, rising from less than 4 per cent in the early 1960s to 10 per 
cent in the latter half of the 1970s. The share of the forestry 
sector on the other hand has steadily declined since 1960. It is of 
interest to note that the value added in both these natural-resource 
intensive sectors showed an absolute decline when the figures for the 
first half of the 1980s are compared with those for the latter half of 
the 1970s.
Indeed, a recurrent theme in what follows is the past dependence 
of Thai agriculture on the exploitation, and in some cases, even the 
mining of natural resources. The expansion of the crop subsector has 
been made possible by the clearance of forests with clearly observable
3results not only on the amount of forest cover, but also on the output 
from the forestry sector. As these natural resources are exhausted, 
attempts would be made to shift from capture to culture, with varying 
degrees of success, as will be discussed further below.
Crops: Crop production remains the backbone of Thai agriculture.
Its expansion rate has been extremely rapid, peaking in the 1960s. 
Between 1958 and 1973, when the burst of road-building opened up vast 
new areas, the growi,h rate averaged 5.0 per cent per annum. Since 
1973, the growth rate has slackened to 3.9 per cent, with much of the 
decline taking place in the later part of the period.
Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of the crops grown in 
Thailand using two different classifications. Figure 1 categorizes
the crops according to plant types: paddy, upland field crops, tree
crops, vegetables and other crops, whilst Figure 2 categorizes the 
crops according to the nature of the markets they face: paddy, export, 
import-competing and non-traded crops.
As there is considerable overlap between the categories of upland 
and export crops. The dramatic expansion of these two categories 
tells different parts of the same story. The new land areas that are 
opened up are well-suited to grow upland crops such as maize in the 
early 1960s, kenaf in the mid-1960s, cassava in the 1970s, and 
sugarcane in the 1960s and 1970s. Most of these find their markets 
overseas. The trigger that set each of these crops off on its rapid 
expansion has been different: for maize it was the introduction of the 
Guatemala variety which turned out to be particularly well suited to 
Thai conditions, for kenaf it was the failure of the jute crop in what
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was then East. Pakistan, for cassava it was the demand arising from the 
peculiar system of protection within the European Community. The case 
of sugarcane is slightly different: its origins have to be traced back 
to the import substitution policies followed from the 1950s and 
continued protection even after sugar began to be exported 
(Jessadachatr). But regardless of what triggered the boom in each of 
these crops, the availability of land allowed its rapid expansion, 
seldom at the expense of other crops.
The relative decline of the paddy sector indicates the relative 
scarcity of paddy land. Even here, Thailand’s performance has again 
been an exception among Asian countries in that land expansion 
explains the greater part of the production increase relative to yield 
increases (Barker, Herdt and Rose 1985:46-50).
Among the other crops, the surprising thing to note is the 
constant share of the nontraded items within the crop subsector, 
indicating that its share in total GNP has declined. This part of 
agriculture is dominated by the fruits and vegetables, which are 
expected to be income-elastic. The slow increase in their production 
would suggest that there is now considerable scope for investment in 
this portion of agriculture to serve the domestic market.
Livestock: Dramatic shifts have taken place within the livestock
sector. The postwar period saw a continual replacement of tractors 
for animal-drawn ploughs. The upland areas have been using tractors 
from the beginning. But more recently, starting around 1970 and 
coinciding with the introduction of second-cropping in the Chao Phraya 
delta, ploughing of paddy lands began to be done by two-wheeled and
four-wheeled power tillers. As the stock of buffaloes and cattle were 
drawn down as a result of these shifts, the total value-added of this 
line of activity grew slowly (Table 1). Only recently has the high 
income elasticity for beef in consumption begun to make an impact on 
domestic beef production.
Dietary changes have had a more noticeable impact on the demand 
for poultry products, and should have had a similar impact on swine 
production. Poultry production is a clear success story of Thai 
livestock production. The introduction of modern breed of poultry, 
particularly for chicken and eggs, and advanced methods of raising
them and the propagation of these methods have been facilitated by 
large agri-businesses who pioneered the contract farming methods 
starting in the early 1970s. These innovations and low feed prices
(Thailand has a surplus in carbohydrate feeds) have been responsible
for the real decline in poultry prices and have tended to increase the 
importance of poultry products in Thai diets which have grown at the 
expense of the traditional fish. Present consumption stands at about 
6.6 kg. per capita per year (Setboonsamg et al. 1989:190) In recent 
years increasing amounts of poultry are being exported, mostly to
Japan.
Consumption of pork stands at 4.7 kg. per capita per year 
(Setboonsarng et al. 1989:130). Its role in the Thai diet could have 
been much larger, had it not been for restrictive policies followed 
towards the slaughtering industry (which has also adversely affected 
beef consumption).

Fisheries: The marine branch of the fisheries industry was
marked by a very rapid expansion in the 1960s. There was a trawler 
revolution and Thailand, almost overnight, became a major fishing
nation on the high seas. Demersal (sea-bed) fishing grew rapidly. 
The motorization of fishing boats in the 1950s and the 1960s and the 
replacement of the bamboo-stake by the purse-seine technique led to an 
expansion of pelagic capture as well (Arbhabhirama et al 1989).
These intensive methods of capture naturally led to the 
exhaustion of the resources, and as those close at hand are wiped out, 
Thai fishermen ranged further afield. The increase in oil prices and 
the introduction of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone in the 1970s 
spelt an end to the rapid growth of the Thai marine fishing industry.
The story in the case of inland fisheries is similar, although
here the population pressure has been the more important factor.
In recent years, the response to the exhaustion of naturally
available resources has been the shift to aquaculture. Fresh water 
aquaculture, particularly of catfish, had a boom in the latter part of 
the 1970s, but came to an abrupt end in the early 1980s as a result of 
a severe epidemic of an apparently viral disease. There has since 
then been a revival but concentrating on the cultivation of fresh 
water shrimps.
Marine aquaculture is also enjoying a boom, with the introduction 
of Taiwanese technology in the raising of tiger prawns. Major 
investments have been made in the mangrove forest areas along the 
coast.
Much of the output of the marine fishery industry is exported. 
The value of the fisheries exports in 1988 (except canned fish— much 
of which is canned tuna for which the catch is brought in by foreign 
ships) is US$ ... million, having grown particularly rapidly from US$ 
244 million in 1986.
Forestry: The depletion of Thai forests has been particularly
rapid, and is in reality the reverse side of the coin from the story 
of rapid growth in crop production. Much of the country’s timber 
requirements are now met by imports. The movement away from capture 
to culture is also evident in this sector. The Royal Forestry 
Department has in recent years been promoting plantations of 
eucalyptus (E. calmandulensis) to produce wood-pulp. Although the 
alleged reasons for the promotion are to reforest forest reserves that 
have been lost to the plough (and the tractor) and to substitute for 
imported pulp, an important motive for the Forestry Department is to 
reacquire the land back from farmers who have illegally occupied it.
Inputs
Land: No other aspect of Thai agriculture is as emotion-laden as
the issue of cultivable land and its complement, forest land. Over 
the four decades since the second world war, the total farm land area 
has been steadily expanding at the expense of the forest (Table 2). 
Until the latter half of the 1970s, the amount of land cultivated per 
agricultural worker has been actually increasing. The period of the 
most rapid expansion has been the 1960s, when more kilometers of road 
were being added than probably any other period in Thai history. 
Another factor that made the post.wa expansion qualitatively different
I
from the traditional methods followed by Thai farmers in earlier times 
is the availability of the tractors. This has had two influences. It 
made the process of land clearance much easier (Moerman 1968, 
particularly Chapter 8), and it made the areas cultivatable by each 
farm family much larger than it would have been, if the farmer has to 
depend on draft animals. This lifting of the constraint on the amount 
of land that is cultivatable by each farmer probably speeded up the 
pace of land clearance.
Did farmers overdo it? The steep decline in forest land as a 
result of the increase in cultivation has been much debated in recent 
years, as the adverse environmental impact of deforestation has become 
a major item of the political agenda. Much of the land that is
supposed to be "deforested" by farmers is in areas that are claimed by
the Forestry Department, relying on an old law that went back to 1897. 
By this law, the Department could lay claim to half of the total land
area of the Kingdom. The claim is grossly unrealistic from the
administrative and policing point of view, and seems to be hardly 
justified even from the environmental point of view. The result is 
that the Department is unable to protect even those lands that are 
environmentally fragile (e.g. watershed areas), this time from
loggers, while farmers in perfectly good agricultural lands are
prevented from acquiring title to the lands, with adverse economic and 
social consequences (see discussion concerning property rights below). 
In any case some mapping studies by the World Bank in 1982 appears to 
indicate that farmers do not encroach on environmentally fragile 
lands— the overwhelming proportion of the land on which they have
moved into, unsurprisingly, is land that is suited for agriculture.
Labor: The availability of land for clearance and cultivation
has enabled the agricultural sector to absorb the rapidly increasing 
labor force. According to the Population Censuses, the growth of the 
aggregate labor force was 1.7% betwen 1960 and 1970, and 3.8% between 
1970 and 1980, the jump in the 1970s being partly explained by the 
high birth rates in the late 1950s and the 1960s, and partly by the 
increase in female labor force participation.
The three censuses indicate that the agricultural labor force has 
been, as expected declining as a proportion of the total from 82% in 
1960 to 78% and 71% in 1970 and 1980 respectively. These figures are 
high by international standards (Figure 3). Of course, the 
availability of land may have kept more of the labor force in 
agriculture than would otherwise be the case, but the census data 
which ask respondents their primary occupation, are somewhat biased 
upward. The bulk of Thai agriculture is rainfed and therefore does 
not provide year-round employment to the farmer and his family. If we 
examine data from the Labor Force Surveys which are conducted in two 
rounds every year, a different picture emerges (Table 3). Not only do 
many people leave the labor force altogether during the dry season, 
but the share of those that do stay also drops. A study of rural off- 
farm employment (Akrasanee et al 1983) indicates that among rural 
households in the North and Northeast, farm income provides less than 
half of the total income, in some areas actually less than a quarter. 
These figures may underestimate agriculture’s contribution, inasmuch 
as a quarter to a third of their income was earned as wages, a large 
part of which may come from the agricultural sector.


A conclusion that may safely be drawn that the 71% of the labor 
force said to belong to the agricultural sector by the 1980 Census is 
somewhat exaggerated, even for that year. A figure somewhat less than 
two-thirds for the mid-1980s would probably be nearer the mark. This 
figure is derived from the wet season average from the Labor Force 
Surveys. This would make the Thai figures somewhat closer to the 1965 
figures for Malaysia, another land-surplus country whose income at 
that time was about where Thailand was in 1985.
Over the decades, the amount of schooling that Thais receive has 
been steadily increasing. The results of this effort put in by the 
Thai state are shown in Table 4. The expansion, particularly of the 
number of people who have finished primary schooling has had a 
considerable impact on productivity growth in Thai agriculture, as 
will be showTi below.
Public capital: Expansion of agricultural production in the past
has been accompanied by a heavy investment in public infrastructure. 
We have often alluded to the role of roads in the opening up of new 
lands. More directly, the government has also invested heavily in 
irrigation. Between 1950 and 1984, it has poured altogether US$3.6
billion (at 1984 prices) in various schemes all across the country, 
with the bulk going to the Chao Phraya delta, the country’s premier 
rice-growing area.
The pace of investment in irrigation has slackened off recently, 
partly because of the increasing cost of irrigation, as the easier 
sites have been already developed, and partly because of the declining

price of rice. Indeed, since 1983, large-scale irrigation projects 
have all but ceased to be implemented.
Questions have been raised with respect to irrigation investments 
in Thailand. In most of the ex post analyses, the productivity of 
irrigation investments have been on the low side. Small and 
Mongkolsmai have estimated the rates of return to be of the order of 3 
to 5 per cent, but these computations were made in the early 1970s 
when dry-season cultivation of rice was just beginning to take off. 
Our own estimates for the growth accounting exercise below found very 
little impact for irrigation.
The utilization of the public capital embodied in the irrigation 
structures remains relatively poor. Not that it is underutilized— on 
the contrary, the main constraint to dry-season rice production is the 
amount of water that could be stored during the monsoon in the main 
storage dams. Rather, the problem is its specificity. Most of the 
structures were designed to produce rice, while actual cultivation in 
the Central irrigated areas has moved considerably away from rice. 
Better utilization of these structures will have to await investments 
that will make the system somewhat more sophisticated.
Private capital: Thai farmers have over the years made long-term
investments in the clearance of new lands, in land development 
(e.g.levelling), in planting perennials, in livestock and lately in 
machineries. Little data exist on the total size of these
investments, and how they compare with the major public works 
discussed above. Looking at the factor shares in the cost of 
production for crops estimates provided by the government, it is
remarkable how small the share of capital is (typically less than 
10%). Of course the share would be larger for the livestock and 
fisheries subsectors.
New Technology: Each individual crop grown in Thailand has
undergone relatively little technological change. By and large, there 
is little application of what is conventionally regarded in the rest 
of Asia as modern technology. There is little use of modern high- 
yielding varieties of rice, for example, and the rate of fertilizer 
application is well below that in most of the rest of Asia. Only in 
the use of machineries are Thai farmers somewhat ahead of their 
brethern in the rest of Asia. The outcome is that agricultural yields 
in Thailand in general lag behind other countries.
To look at technological developments at the level of each
individual crop is to underestimate the technological dynamism
displayed by the Thai fanner during the last three decades. While he
haas used age-old techniques to grow any particular crop, he has also 
been adopting new crops with speed, aided by the availability of 
abundant land resources. And it is this same abundance of land
resources that he has been slower to intensify his practices. But it 
must be remembered that acceptance of a new crop is no less an 
innovation than acceptance of a new technique or a new variety.
The government has expended resources to promote technological 
change, at least for the crop subsector. The amount put in has
however not been as large as it could be. In this respect, Thai
agriculture has suffered the misfortune of its success, at least as 
far as its competitiveness in the world markets. Because Thailand
exports most agricultural commodities, there is not a sufficiently 
strong impulse for the government to invest in research, unlike in 
India and Indonesia where the drive to attain self-sufficiency has 
impelled their governments to put in large resources to research and 
promote new technology. It is interesting to note that import- 
substituting crops have claimed relatively more research money than 
export crops such as rice or maize (Table 5).
Among the export crops, the research system has not been 
instrumental in introducing new crops (see following paragraph). But 
once a crop has proved its commercial success, the research budget 
would tend to expand pasi passu with its importance in the economy 
(Setboonsarng). This behavior indicates that an important motive of 
the government to promote productivity of the farmer is to increase 
his income, rather than to protect the competitiveness of the 
particular crop. In this sense, research policy has followed rather 
than led comparative advantage.
The key player in introducing new crops has been the private 
sector, but once a crop has been thus introduced, it has not been 
active in researching new technology to grow that crop. Even in the 
poultry sector, where the private firm has played a dominant role, the 
domestic firms have mostly been the conduit for technology produced by 
foreign multinationals. Only recently have hybrid—maize seed firms 
begun to conduct research of their own (Setboonsarng, Wattanutchariya 
and Puthigom 1988), and much of that work has capitalized on the 
success of the Suwan varieties— a success of the public sector 
research.
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TABLE 5
Research Expenditure per 100 Baht of Crop Value
1Crops 1987 1988
Exportable Crops
Rice 0.49 0. 37
Rubber 0. 46 0. 54
Mai ze 0. 52 0. 20
Tapioca 0. 20 0. 18
Sugarcane 0. 43 0.23
Mungbean 0. 88 0.74
3orghum 1.01 0.77
Importable Crops
Soybean 0. 79 0.86
Oil Palm 0. 72 0.48'-
Cotton 4.35 2. 30
Groundnut 1 . 20 2.30
Source: Setboonsarng and Khaoborisuth (forthcoming), Research
Budget Allocation of the Department of Agriculture,
Discussion Paper for the Research Priorities in Thai
Agriculture Project, Department of Agriculture,
Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI),
Australian Centre of International Agricutural
Research (ACIAR) and International Service for
National Agricultural Research (ISNAR).
Not to be omitted are the Thai farmers’ trial—and—error methods 
that they have been practising for millennia. These have been a key 
component of advance in the horticultural sector, and more recently in 
the swine industry.
Growth Accounting
The following reports on a growth accounting exercise that was 
conducted only for the crop sector. The implicit model behind it is 
based on the following equation:
In y/n = po + pi.In p + p2.1n pf + p3 .1n h/n + p4.1n k/n
p5.In s + pe.ln r.ln i + pv.ln zi + p8.1n z2 + u
(1)
where y = index of output,
n = agricultural labor force, 
p = index of output prices, 
pf = fertilizer prices, 
h = cultivated area,
k = index ol capital stock,
s = average number of years of schooling,
r = cumulated national research expenditures, 
i = cumulated irrigation expenditures, 
zi and z2 are two indicators for rainfall (not used in 
the growth accounting exercise below, and 
u = random term.
The model is run against provincial level data for the period 
1961 to 1985, in other words we have a panel data consisting of
provincial—level observations for all the variables, except research 
expenditures whose output is regarded as a public good, accessible to 
all provinces. The details of the estimation are given in
Patamasiriwat and Suewattana (1990), we give below a brief explanation 
concerning the economics behind the assumptions that are made.
Essentially this is a supply function, hence the presence of 
output and fertilizer prices. However, we also assume that in each 
year, the quantities of land and labor are fixed for each province, as 
a historical given, hence the presence of these variables in the 
equation above. Actually the equation above is part of a larger model 
which explains changes in these factor quantities from one year to the 
next, but this will not be reported here.
The estimated equation gives us the means to estimate the sources 
of growth of output per capita during the period 1961-1985. The 
result of the exercise is given in Table 6. Because we consider the 
end of the land surplus in the late 1970s to be an important 
watershed, we have also reported the growth accounting exercises for 
the two subperiods before and after that watershed.
The most striking, and surprising, result is the major role 
played by schooling in explaining the productivity increase in 
agriculture. This result appears to be very robust against different 
specifications of the equation. Considering that much of the increase 
in schooling took place at the primary level, the result does show 
that at this level, there is considerable impact on productivity.

A somewhat more obvious result, in view of what we have said 
earlier, is the role played by increases in per capita land 
availability. The contrast between the period before 1976/1978 and 
the period thereafter should be noted.
We have tried to measure the impact of agricultural research and 
irrigation, and found their sizes to be relatively small. We would 
like to add that the result reported in Table 6 is not very robust, 
and is obtained against much experimentation with various 
specifications other than the multiplicative interaction as stated in 
equation (1) above. The rationalization of this particular
specification is that the impact of research is felt only in irrigated 
areas. We would also conjecture that the main result of irrigation in 
Thailand has led to a substitution of rice for other crops, but has 
not led to much aggregate increase in productivity.
A specification involving a trend term appears to be 
insignificant. Nevertheless the shift in the values of the 
unexplained residual between the first and second period (mostly the 
effect of u in equation (1) above) should be noted. Although the 
figures do not warrant this, we would still speculate that in the more 
recent past, as land has become scarcer, a more intensive technology 
is being adopted by Thai farmers.
INSTITUTIONS
Property Rights in Land
Among Asian countries, Thailand is probably unique as far as the 
nature of its property rights problems in land is concerned. It might
have been thought that the abundance of land would make the land 
distribution in Thailand more egalitarian than in the more overcrowded 
parts of Asia. This is to some extent true. While tenancy is 
widespread in some of the older rice—growing parts of the Central 
plains and in the Northern valleys, in the Northeast and in the newly 
settled areas fringing the Central plains, the incidence of tenancy is 
quite small (Tab1e 7).
The more severe problem faced by Thai farmers is rather that they 
do not have clear title to the land they till. As many as a million 
farm-househoIds (out of a total of some five million) are technically 
squatters of land which the government claims is the nation’s forest 
reserve. At least 30% of the land outside the reserves occupied by 
these farmers has for a long period not obtained a clear 
collateralizable title to the land. The statistics cited here (mostly 
from TDR1 1986) are couched in vague terms, for the simple reason that 
there is no firm set of data on which to make a more precise 
statement. Partly, the situation is so dynamic that there is 
difficulty in making up-to-date estimates. More seriously, there 
appears to be a lack of interest in having clear sets of estimates. 
Thus the agency responsible for issuing the three types of clearly 
collaterizable land titles (the Land Department) cannot even give an 
exact answer to the simple question: how much land do all the titles 
it has ever issued cover?
The consequence of this past lackadaisical performance on issuing 
clear land titles appears now on two fronts. The first is on the 
issue of land conservation. Because there are now a large number of

people who are technically squatters on the government's forest land, 
the government has found it difficult to enunciate a clear and 
acceptable set of policies on forestry and conservation. On the one 
hand, public opinion appears to favor a strong pro-conservation policy 
for the forests, but on the other it would not tolerate a pol.ic> of 
eviction towards the squatters. In 1985, the government formulated a 
forestry policy which seems to follow the worst aspects of both 
alternatives (see the policy section below).
The second consequence appears to have been on agricultural 
productivity. Here we have some very strong and empirically well- 
supported arguments made by Feder et al. (1988). They show that the 
lack of land titles does not lead to less security in land tenure. In 
general, even on forest reserves, the probability of farmers without 
land titles being evicted from their land is quite low, although not 
quite zero. Indeed there is an active market in land without titles. 
Consequently, the impact on agricultural productivity through this 
pathway is negligible. However, when the land that farmers hold 
cannot be placed as collateral for long-term loans— and long-term 
loans even from informal sectors do require collateral, then farmers 
are unable to make investments in land or even equipments. This 
clearly has an impact on agricultural productivity. Through this 
pathway, land with titles sometimes fetch as much as double the price 
of land without titles (Feder et al 1988:93), although the social 
discounted value of the additional productivity is somewhat less, 
although still substantial at about 50%. In areas where the credit 
markets seem to be particularly active, this premium on titling is 
much less (Feder et al 1988: 142-3).
Other factor markets
Labor markets: As with agriculture everywhere, labor demand is
highly seasonal. As much of the supply labor is also from rural 
households, the supply is also highly seasonal. Much exchange of 
labor among farm households takes place. In the past such exchange 
has been in the form of barter among households within a village. 
Such practice has rapidly declined, apparently for two reasons. The 
first reason is that the rural economy has become more monetized, the 
transactions cost can therefore be reduced by using money instead of 
inter-household labor debt. Secondly, the rhythm of agricultural work 
within a village has become more synchronized, certainly within 
irrigated villages, but also within some cash-crop growing villages; 
consequently, farmers have to range beyond their villages in order to
procure labor. Such outside labor can only be hired on cash-wage
basis.
The expanded demand for hired labor is partly met by landless 
households, but the proportion of landless households in Thailand is 
still relatively small (Table 8). Much of the demand for hired labor 
is met by other farm households, with the Northeasterners being 
notably in a position of excess supply, and the Central region farmers 
(particularly sugarcane farmers who usually farm very large areas 
ranging upto 500 hectares) in a position of excess demand most of the 
time. Considerable seasonal migration takes place to match these
gaps. The sugarcane harvest alone requires the presence of 200,000
additional hired hands from the Northeast (Busayawit 1978:20-21, 
adjusted for the expanded production since then). Where considerable
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Table 8 Percentage of the Landless, Near-landless and Small Farmers
Area
Type of Farmers
Landless"1 Near-landless ^ SmallC Other5 Total
Selected Provinces'2 10.59
(92,034)
3.25
(28,287)
4.53
(39,354)
81.63
(709,469)
100
(869,144)
Upper Nortl/ 13.48
(12,245)
31.37
(28,511)
27.51
(25,002)
27.64
(25,116)
100
(90,874)
aLower North and Some
Parts of Central Plain
10.11
(74,977)
8.16
(60,503)
9.61
(71.275)
72.12
(534,948)
100
(741.723)
East and Some Parts 
of Central Plain
13.03
(39,802)
7.4
(22,593)
7.86
(24,006)
71.71
(218,973)
100
(305,374)
Figures in parentheses are the estimated number of farms from the survey.
Notes: a. Those who do not own any land (excluding homelot) and do not rent any land
from other people. They are mainly farm labourers.
b. Those who own less than 5 rai of land and have a net cultivated area of not 
more than 5 rai (including own land and rented land).
c. Those who own less than 10 rai and have a net cultivated area of not more than
10 rai.
d. Other means those holding over 10 rai of land.
e. the survey, conducted in 1979, covered 3 provinces in lower North, one in the
Northeast (Khorat), and 8 provinces in the Central Plain.
f. 1981, covered 8 provinces.
g. 1982, covered 13 provinces (3 in lower North).
h. 1983, covered 9 provinces (6 in Central Plain).
Source: Agricultural Land Reform Office assembled by Arbhabhirama et at.
(1987: Table 2:11)
amount of transactions take place, as in this case, sophisticated 
method of forward labor contracting (involving a nominally interest- 
free advance by the employer) has been devised to ensure that adequate 
labor will be forthcoming at harvest time (Siamwalla 1990).
In the Central paddy-growing irrigated areas, on the other hand 
where (a) farm sizes are relatively small and (b) the labor
requirement among neighboring areas is almost simultaneous, a consi­
derable amount of the farmer’s management skill has to be devoted to 
planning his precise labor requirements, and to acquire knowledge 
about neighboring areas’ requirements sq as to be able to acquire the 
labor when the need arises.
This sketch of the intra-rural markets should be sufficient to
indicate two essential points: firstly, we can safely jettison the
simple version of the surplus labor hypothesis, namely that a certain
amount of it can be removed from the agricultural sector for yean-
round employment elsewhere wdthout any impact on agricultural
production, and secondly, on the other hand, it is possible that
considerable disequilibria could exist in the rural labor markets, as
there is very little systematic conveying of information between areas
that are temporarily in surplus and those that are in deficit (see
particularly Sussangkarn’s paper in this volume). It is because of
these disequilibria that considerable geographical inequalities exist
m  incomes. Thus, because of these inequalities the average landless
household’s income in the Central region ends up being higher than an
owner-occupier’s income in the Northeast (Siamwalla and Na Ranong 
1990).
Credit markets: In rural areas, credit has been traditionally
provided by informal lenders, from within the village by better-off
farm households or by individuals on fixed incomes (e.g. public school
teachers) and from outside the village, mostly by traders. The 
government has had a long history (since 1916 in fact) of trying to 
replace these lenders who are accused of charging exorbitant interest 
rates. Only with the setting up of the Bank for .Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) in 1969, has the government acquired 
an institutional basis to make inroads into the informal sector’s role
in the rural credit markets— the earlier dependence on cooperatives
having been consistently unsuccessful. An additional boost was given
by the policy announced in 1975 forcing the commercial banks to lend a
proportion of its portfolio to the agricultural sector. As a 
consequence of these policies, the share of the formal sector loans
provided to farm households has gone up from about 10% in the 1960s to
something closer to a half in the 1980s (Siamwalla 1990).
Both the informal and the formal sectors appear to have been 
successful in meeting the short-term credit needs of the better-off 
and middling farmers. Long term credit from both these sources is 
relatively rare and invariably entails putting up land as collateral.
There do exist many market devices which substitute for credit. 
Thus large tractors have been sometime acquired (frequently on hire- 
purchase) by better-off households, and then leased for custom- 
ploughing by the other farmers. In the case of the modern livestock 
sector, large agribusinesses have been providing capital to the 
farmers at the start of their career. Another financial source for
the rubber growers is the Rubber Replanting Fund, which provides a 
grant to farmers wishing to replant their trees. The "repayment" is 
in the form of a cess levied on all rubber exports. But these 
examples are mostly in the nature of ad hoc solutions to the basic 
absence of long-term credit. As Thai agriculture becomes more 
capital-intensive, the absence of long-term credit institutions would 
work against farmers who do not have titled land.
Output markets
Internal trade in agricultural products in Thailand has been 
generally free from government intervention. As a result the 
organization and institutions connected with this trade has evolved 
over the decades in response to the market pressure and the traders ’ 
own needs. The elaboration with which the marketing institutions have 
evolved varies across different commodities and depends on certain 
factors connected with the processing technology, the perishability of 
the products, and the requirements imposed by the final consumers 
(Siamwalla 1978). We may divide teh market organizations for the 
products of Thai agriculture into two types: arms’ length markets and
contract farming systems. This is a broad categorization: some
markets have mixed characteristics.
Arms length markets: Most major commodities are traded on arms’
lenth basis, starting from the farmers through myriads of middlemen 
through processors and so on down the chain to exporters or final 
consumers. With the expansion of the market, there would be 
increasing differentiation of the functions, although it is typical 
for a middleman to deal in many commodities: this is the seasonality
is even stronger in the trade of agricultural products than in their 
production. Traders therefore find it worthwhile to handle many
commodities.
At the farmgate level, a farmer usually deals with middlemen in 
the district towns, or if a processor is close by, he may deal 
directly with him. In most arms’ length markets, the farmer is 
generally not tied to any particular middleman, but will switch from 
one to another depending on the prices offered. Exceptions occur in 
the cases of rice in some poorer areas and maize, where credit ties 
will cause farmers to stick with one buyer.
Further along in the marketing chain the markets are efficiently 
organized (Pinthong 1977 gives a good account of the rice trade) . For 
each commodity, there is typically a central wholesale market where 
buyers and sellers converge in an informal auction market.
Alternatively, where processors or silo facilities are concentrated,
they would post up prices which become the market information that is 
passed along the chain. The information role in the Bangkok wholesale 
trade (e.g. for rice for exports) is undertaken by brokers, with whom 
upcountry millers and traders are in constant communication, nowadays 
by telephone.
Despite allegations to the contrary, research into this type of 
markets has consistently failed to find evidence of any substantial 
monopsonistic or monopolistic element (Siamwalla 1978). A more 
sophisticated, and probably more valid, charge could be brought 
against the present marketing system is that it pays insufficient heed
to the quality of the product. Thus, for a long time, the cassava
trade was plagued by problems of adulteration. It is noticeable that 
in this and in other cases, as the markets are given time to evolve, 
the problem tends to disappear. Thus in the case of cassava, traders 
began the practice of pay a differential price for the cassava roots 
according to their starch content. The fancier rices have always had 
a separate marketing channel, from the less differntiated export rice. 
However this natural evolution takes time to develop and may not be 
appropriate for international trade in high-valued horticultural 
products.
Contract farming: In the last few decades, a new mode of
handling certain agricultural products has emerged, e.g. in sugarcane, 
tobacco and poultry. The specific circumstances that give rise to 
such transactions vary. They range from the scheduling needs of the 
processors (sugarcane) to the need to control the particular variety 
to be delivered to the overseas market (tobacco). The success of 
these arrangements in promoting technical change, for example in the 
case of poultry, and the fact that many such arrangements appear to 
reduce the price risk for the farmers have led many to advocate the 
expansion of this type of arrangement to other products. Furthermore, 
where quality is an important consideration, it appears that such 
types of transactions can convey information regarding consumer 
preferences better than can arms’ length markets.
However, there is little understanding of the reasons for the 
emergence of contract farming in any given branch of agriculture (see 
Siamwalla 1978 for an attempt). Without a careful analysis of the 
situation, introduction of contract farming runs a severe risk of
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failure. Thus early pineapple canneries thought they could mimic the 
arrangements prevalent in the sugar industry, only to find themselves 
running huge losses from contract defaults by the farmers. In more 
recent times, a number of analysts have raised questions regarding the 
burden of risk borne by farmers, particularly in the case of exotic 
crops or new technologies introduced by the contracting firms.
Local Economic Institutions
Agriculture is probably the most space-intensive of all economic 
activities. .As such there would appear to be considerable scope for 
local public goods to contribute to agricultural production. The role 
of local (i.e. village-level) institutions has not been much studied 
by economists. From studies made by noneconomists and economic 
historians, it appears that local economic institutions play a 
relatively small role in agricultural production. In this respect, 
the Thai experience contrasts with those of East Asia. Furthermore 
whatever role there was has been diminishing rapidly in recent years. 
The reasons for the diminishing role of local economic institutions 
are as follow:
Firstly, Thai agricultural systems, except in the upper Northern 
provinces, do not depend much on communally constructed and maintained 
irrigation systems. The irrigation systems that have come into 
existence in the Central plains are constructed and maintained by the 
State. Even though the problem of allocation could have given rise to 
a communal organization, a system of de facto rights have developed 
instead which gives absolute priority to upstream fanners. Even in 
the North, the communally built and maintained systems are now being
replaced by more permanent structures constructed by the State. The 
traditional systems with its heavy maintenance requirements were the 
focus of sophisticated communal organizations which levy labor 
contributions from among the beneficiaries.
Secondly, local security was traditionally a local matter, from 
the point of view of practical necessity. With improved transport and 
communications, the State’s presence in the villages was no longer as 
fitful as in the past. The need for village solidarity against 
outsiders has weakened.
The third reason, not entirely independent from the second, is 
that there is little direct taxation on Thai farmers. The 
overwhelming majority of them earn too small an income to be subject 
to the income tax. Land taxes are very light (incidentally also a 
reason for the State’s lackadaisical performance in assigning property 
rights in land). There was thus no need for a village-level 
collective apparatus to handle the State taxation, such as existed in 
pre-colonial Vietnam.
The absence of local economic institutions partly explains the 
ease with which the forest areas surrounding villages have been 
cleared for cultivation. Traditionally, until a given piece of land 
is cleared for cultivation, the land is considered as communal 
property, to which all villagers have access. Once someone clears the 
land, it is generally recognized as his. When land was plentiful, 
this traditional practice did not require elaborate organization or 
formal rules. As land became scarce during the last decade, there was 
thus nothing to prevent massive encroachments by individuals inside
the village or by government officials or a coalition of both. The 
question of village common land became another layer in the 
complicated land issue.
However, one local institution is economically important evem 
though it does not directly contribute to agricultural production, 
namely the village temple. Temple building in Thailand is financed by 
local contributions, and there is a lay committee that oversees its 
finances. Because the temple is sometimes the only functioning 
village-level financial organization, villagers themselves and many 
development agencies have latched on to it to promote and operate 
communal activities.
POLICIES
Thai government policies have significantly affected the agri­
cultural sector through four different instruments: through its
attempts to manipulate land use; through its expenditure policies, 
particularly on irrigation and research; and through its pricing 
policies.
Before we discuss each of these policies in turn, it is important 
to point out that the Thai political system has not had an articulated 
set of policies towards the agricultural sector as a whole. Where 
pronouncements on such policies have been made, for example, as in the 
development plans, those policies have not been significant or have 
not been carried out (except irrigation), but in any case they were 
not considered in tandem much more powerful measures applied to 
agriculture, for example, the export taxes and restrictions.
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Land and land use policies: The account given above has pointed
out the complexities of the land problem in Thailand. The 
government’s main sin in the past have been one of omission than of 
commission. Essentially, it has failed to set up a clear procedure to 
grant property rights to a great deal of the land that was perfectly 
well-suited for agriculture, and which was taken over anyhow by the 
farmers for that purpose. Now that farmers have occupied these lands, 
in its attempt to resume control over them, the government has now 
decided to shift from the sins of omission to the sins of commission.
The premise of the land policies announced in 1985 was to reverse 
the feared environmental damage created by the continual deforestation 
that was taking place. The problem was to place some of these
deforested lands back to forest cover. The government defined two
categories of forest land: natural forests and economic forests. The
natural forests were defined entirely on the basis of environmental
considerations (e.g. areas with steep slopes, watershed areas) and 
were to cover about 15 % of the total area of the country. Where
these have been denuded, the Royal Forestry Department (RFD) was
itself to do the replanting. On the other hand, the economic 
"forests" were to be planted to tree-crops. From the way the policy 
was to be later implemented, it appears that no environmental 
consideration was involved in the decision to have the figure of 
another 25% of land devoted to economic "forests". It turns out that 
the method used to calculate the area to be put under economic 
"forests" was calculated using estimates of demand for tree-crop
products such as rubber, fruit, oi1-palm and timber, and requiring
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that that demand is to be met entirely from domestic sources without 
any imports.
The central motivation of this set of policies is the attempt by 
the RFD to reacquire control over the lands which were occupied by 
farmers, illegally in the eyes of RFD. The RFD is willing to issue 
these farmers with nontransferable (and therefore nonco1lateralizable) 
occupancy certificates, provided they use the land in the manner 
prescribed by it, namely to plant tree crops. More pointedly, the RFD 
could allow private companies to lease, at a nominal rent, the land 
that it claims (but which may already be occupied by what it calls 
"squatters") and use it to grow specified fast-growing trees. In the 
last few years the crop of choice is Eucalyptus calmandulensis, which 
is considered highly suitable to produce paper pulp. In recent years, 
the expansion of agri-businesses entering this field has led to a 
number of celebrated conflicts with local farmers, and has become a 
burning political issue.
In any case, this attempt of the government to expand the area 
under "economic forests" has led it to attempt the regulation of land 
use on economic grounds, something it has never done on such a massive 
scale. It is doubly unfortunate that this attempt should be based on 
such economic and environmental grounds, and, worse, that in some 
cases, agribusinesses were given the task of evicting the squatters 
who were not doing anything better or worse than those who are 
evicting them.
Irrigation: Before 1980, probably the largest impact of
government action on agricultural production would be felt through its
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decisions on irrigation investments. The objectives of the Thai 
government in making these investments are far from clear. We can say 
what they are not. As an exporter of rice, the government certainly 
had little drive to attain self-sufficiency, as is the case with 
Indonesia, the Philippines or other importers, although admittedly, 
changes in the world rice does have some impact on the pace of 
investments (thus investments fell in 1969-1971 and in 1982-1985 when 
rice prices were very low). Had the need to maximize production been 
the motive force, the government would have concentrated 
singlemindedly on areas with the greatest potential. To be sure, 
availability of good sites from an engineering point of view would 
have meant favoring the better off areas in any case. Thus the 
government invested massively in the Central plains, in a continuing 
effort that began when the Dutch engineer J. Homan van der Heide 
proposed the project in 1907. With the completion of the Chao Phraya 
and the associated Mae Klong and Pitsanuloke projects, the central 
system has reached a plateau of development from an engineering point 
of view.
With this halt in its central system, the government’s position 
on irrigation development has become even more ambivalent. Much of 
the more recent investments have gone into small-scale systems. In 
this the government is guided by equity considerations, notwith­
standing the fact that the productivity of these investments appears 
at best dubious.
Another area of undoubted weakness is the failure to increase the 
efficiency of the existing systems. Even though the Central system is
now used to its capacity in the dry season in the sense that the main 
constraint to dry-season rice production is the availability of water, 
there is considerable wastage involved. Unpredictable flows have led 
to inefficient use of water, but more than that, they have led 
upstream farmers to hoard water, reducing supplies downstream where 
its productivity would be higher. Furthermore, much of the structures 
were designed with rice producation in mind, and the regulation system 
still assumes that water will be used for rice production, in actual 
practice, much of the irrigated areas have been put to other uses, 
such as horticulture and aquaculture. This shift in land use however 
has had little impact on the Royal Irrigation Department’s (RID) 
operations. However, a rethinking of the RID in this matter would 
have profound implications. In the past, the government has seldom
intervened in the farmers’ use of his land. A regulatory system with
a variegated cropping pattern would be nearly impossible. But if the 
farmers and RID wish to move away from rice and to have the water 
delivery schedule shifted to take account of this fact, a different 
arrangement from the present, generally hands-off attitude, is called 
for. Such a new arrangement could take many forms, but will require 
stronger management and organizational skills of both the RID and the 
farmers.
Credit: As indicated above, the government has intervened in
order to make cheap, institutional credit available to fanners. From
the point of view of the farmers, the partial replacement of the 
informal sources by institutional sources brought about by these 
policies has been clearly and substantially beneficial. The question 
is whether the implicit subsidization th has undoubtedly taken place
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has been larger than is justifiable. The following reports on an 
attempt to calculate the subsidy element (Siamwalla and Nettayarak 
1990).
Three modes of intervention have been used, which implies a 
subsidization of credit in one form or another:
- Commercial banks are required to lend a proportion, now 
set at 14% of its deposits to the agricultural sector;
- The BAAC has chosen to use an average-cost pricing rather 
than the marginal-cost pricing rule in its setting of 
interest rates to be charged to the farmers; and
- Since 1987, the government has introduced a paddy mortgage 
scheme which gives a highly subsidized loan to farmers to 
store their paddy till later in the marketing season.
These policies together have meant an implicit subsidy of the 
agricultural sector of the order of 1 billion baht (US$ 40 million) in 
1987, or less than 1% of the value-added in the agricultural sector. 
Of this total, the lion’s share (about three-quarters) of the 
subsidies is through the second mode of intervention.
Pricing policies: The most powerful instruments applied to
agriculture in the past have been the various border measures applied 
mostly against agricultural exports, but more recently also against 
agricultural imports as well. A fuller account of the policies 
against most of the major agricultural exports is available elsewhere
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(Siamwalla and Setboonsarng 1989), and therefore only a sketch of it 
will be given here.
There appears to be a clear trend in government intervention
measures. .Agricultural tended to be taxed much more heavily in the
past, with rice singled out as the main disprotected item. .Another 
old export item was also heavily taxed, namely rubber. Most of the 
newer export items were lightly treated. In all cases the taxes were 
such as to reduce the variability of domestic prices, with the taxes 
being high when world prices were high as for example in 1973-74.
Sugar was exceptionally treated by having its domestic price to 
consumers being maintained at a higher level than the world price in 
order to subsidize exports. Significantly, sugar used to be imported 
until as recently as 1959, and the industry would remain an importable 
had free trade prevailed until the late 1960s. The protective
policies normal to importables in Thailand thus carried over even
after sugar has clearly become an exportable (i.e. it would still be 
exported if the government ceased to support it) from about the mid- 
1970s onward.
The peak years of heavy anti-agriculture bias were the late 1970s 
and the early 1980s. Starting from about 1982 onwards, disprotection 
of the exportable items steadily declined: maize export was completely 
liberalized at the end of 1981, all taxation of rice exports were 
removed in 1986, and taxation of rubber was gradually reduced and 
temporarily removed altogether in 1989. At the same time another 
exportable commodity, cassava, joined sugar in receiving protective 
treatment. Here the government dissipates the quota rent it receives
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as a result of the voluntary restraint agreement with the European 
Community (EC) in favor of higher exports to non-EC markets, thus 
boosting demand and domestic prices.
This trend away from disprotection can be variously explained. 
The dismantling of the export taxes in the 1980s is in line with the 
implicit policy of stabilizing domestic prices. However, when 
agricultural (particularly rice) prices spurted upwards again in 1987- 
1989, the neutral policies remained in place. These events appear to 
be the strongest confirmation of the alternative hypothesis that the 
political economy of agricultural pricing policies has indeed begun to 
shift in favor of agriculture, and that the pro-farmer rhetoric of the 
post-1973 is at last beginning to be implemented.
Table 9 shows the nominal protection coefficients for eight 
crops, both exportables and importables, from 1970 to 1986. Other them 
confirming the decline in the disprotection of the exportable sector, 
the table also show^ s that the protection rates for importables 
(except cotton) have been rising.
Among nontradables, there have been for a long time what appears 
to be very stringent regulations on slaughtering of swine and cattle. 
Thus a slaughter house cannot be privately owned. Live animals and 
meat transport across provincial boundaries have to be licensed by 
local authorities, and at times altogether banned. An imputed income 
tax is collected with the slaughtering permit, which is issued for 
each individual animal. The combined result of these regulations and 
taxation is that considerable illegal slaughtering takes place, 
usually under unsanitary conditions. ' more recent years, these
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regulations are being relaxed, in the interest of promoting exports, 
particularly of pork.
We close this account of pricing policies by providing some
estimates of the indirect effects of nonagricultural policies on the 
relative prices received by the farmers. The method of calculation is 
given in detail in Siamwalla and Setboonsarng (1989), and is based on 
the methodology developed by Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988).
Briefly, a policy of industrial protection is an implicit tax on 
exportables. The size of this implicit tax could be calculated as the 
extent of devaluation of the real exchange rate necessary if the 
industrial protection is removed. For most of the period lasting from 
the 1960s onwards, the degree of implicit export tax is about 10%. In
addition, when the government had a sizable macroeconomic imbalance as
it did in the early 1980s, and decide to meet such imbalance, not by 
devaluation, but by unsustainable borrowing from abroad, then during 
that period, there is an additional implicit taxation on exports as 
well: in the early 1980s it was of the order of about 10-15%. These 
implicit taxes combined therefore add up to a sizable amount and
exceeded, for that period, the direct imposts of the government on 
agricultural exports (compare Table 10 with Table 9).
WHITHER THAI AGRICULTURE?
Thai agriculture is now at a crossroads. The two factors that
have fuelled its growth in the past can no longer be called on in the
future. These are surplus land and a buoyant foreign market. While 
Thailand will still have comparative advantage in agriculture, the 
sector’s dominance in the economy and ir exports will continue to
TEAR
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TABLE 10
COMBINED EFFECT OF INTERVENTION IN THE AGRICULTURAL AND NONAGRICULTURAL SECTORS 
AND OF MACROECONOMIC IMBALANCES ON RELATIVE PRICES OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
(Proportionate Deviation from Real World Price)
RICE MAIZE
PRODUCER
SUGAR
MILLER EXPORTER
RUBBER CASSAVA COTTON SOYBEAN PALM OIL
-0.3470 -0.2223 -0.0105 0.1256 0.1938 -0.3050 -0.2012 0.7730 NA NA
-0.4006 -0.2208 -0.1744 0.0344 0.1547 -0.2774 -0.1922 0.7225 NA NA
-0.3642 -0.0773 -0.3224 -0.1094 -0.0052 -0.2269 -0.1317 0.7053 NA NA
-0.4619 -0.1842 -0.3613 -0.1971 -0.2363 -0.2512 -0.0966 0.8164 NA NA
-0.4994 -0.0702 -0.6396 -0.4362 -0.5806 -0.2258 -0.0453 0.2346 NA NA
-0.4266 -0.2143 -0.6284 -0.5027 -0.6936 -0.2993 -0.1617 0.2315 NA NA
-0.2835 -0.1773 -0.3262 -0.2454 -0.3617 -0.3267 -0.1518 0.0280 -0.1926 NA
-0.3907 -0.2165 -0.2390 -0.2409 -0.3024 -0.3931 -0.2211 -0.1540 -0.0249 -0.1916
-0.4517 -0.2165 0.0818 -0.1642 -0.0809 -0.3806 -0.2000 -0.0776 -0.0315 -0.1942
-0.4148 -0.2663 0.0707 -0.1503 -0.0680 -0.4192 -0.2317 -0.1200 -0.0423 -0.2434
-0.4045 -0.2379 -0.2168 -0.0244 0.0933 -0.4045 -0.1954 -0.1210 -0.0783 -0.2576
-0.4171 -0.2837 -0.2950 -0.2225 -0.2197 -0.3635 -0.2138 -0.1829 -0.1130 -0.2067
-0.2565 -0.1594 0.1440 -0.0887 0.3454 -0.2697 -0.1604 -0.1308 0.0923 -0.0917
-0.3015 -0.2403 0.1516 0.0265 0.7902 -0.3767 -0.2416 0.0802 -0.0245 -0.1436
-0.2517 -0.2030 0.2202 0.1841 0.8156 -0.3233 -0.2023 -0.0034 0.0269 -0.2990
-0.2203 -0.1843 0.6047 0.0099 1.3517 -0.2704 -0.1492 0.2160 -0.0336 -0.2627
-0.0888 -0.0915 0.6430 -0.0341 1.4109 -0.1920 -0.0446 0.4921 0.2186 0.1971
: For rice and cassava for which Thailand is not a small country, 
the deviation is from the world price as it would be 
if Thailand unilaterally eliminates its intervention.
: Siamwalla and Setboonsarng (1989) for rice, maize, sugar and rubber 
and for the period 1970-1985 with some minor adjustments; 
additional calculations made for the remaining commodities and for 1986.
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decline. It will have to compete with the manufacturing sector even 
for that factor of production which it seems to have in abundance: 
labor. Current prognosis is for the labor force in agriculture to 
decline absolutely sometimes in the 1990s.
These developments, as well as the need to cope' with the legacy 
of inadequate land policies in the past, impose a set of delicate 
issues for the government. First of all, the factor-intensity within 
Thai agriculture will undergo rather complicated changes, as first the 
older trend of decreasing mari-land x-atio will have to be coped with, 
followed soon by a reversal of that trend. At the same time, domestic 
demand will dictate that the more capital-intensive and technology­
intensive horticultural sector will have to expand. Thailand also has 
begun to show promise as an exporter of horticultural and livestock 
products. Whether it can maintain that status in the face of rapidly 
increasing domestic demand and what government trade policy should be
to accommodate both the domestic and foreign needs are issues that
need answers.
Public policy towards agriculture will thus have to address very 
different issues. No longer can the government be content to let the 
farmers grow any crop (on whatever land), have middlemen transport it 
to Bangkok and then collecting a toll only when it is exported. Some
of the issues confronting Thai agriculture now require a very
different organizational framework from what the sector has inherited. 
The government itself will have to reexamine its legal and regulatory 
framework and its own role in it.
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